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Dignity and Discrimination
Frederick Mark Gedicks
Delivered as the Dignity in Law Symposium keynote
address, this essay surveys uses of “dignity” in U.S.
constitutional law, with a focus on conflicts between the dignities
attached to citizenship and religious conscience. Parts I and II
discuss dignity as state sovereignty and hierarchical status.
Part III examines the collision of dignities in the
Masterpiece Cakeshop decision. Part IV argues that attention
to the public or private nature of the site where religious
accommodation is demanded clarifies when accommodation is
appropriate, using a house of worship and a government office as
illustrations. Part V lists other sites of accommodation and briefly
discusses how one might use the public/private distinction despite
its socially constructed character.

 Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School.
This essay is based on a lecture given at the Law School on September 30, 2020, as part
of the BYU Law Review’s Dignity in Law Symposium; it retains some of the informality with
which it was delivered. I thank the editors of the Review for the opportunity to participate
in the Symposium. I’m also grateful to Kif Augustine-Adams and my other faculty
colleagues for comments and criticisms on earlier drafts, to BYU Law Research Librarian
Iantha Haight for indispensable help in finding sources, and to Brickelle Bro,
Mackenzie Knapp, Will Morrison, and Spencer Ostler for excellent research assistance.
Errors that remain are mine.
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I have entitled my remarks today, “Dignity and Discrimination,”
but I might also have titled them, “Dignities and Discrimination”
or, even more precisely, “Which Dignity? . . . and Discrimination.”
There are multiple conceptions of dignity at work in American
constitutional law—the dignity of state sovereignty, the dignity
attached to social status, the dignity wounded by insult, the
dignity of religious conscience, the dignity of the free citizen.
Which of these is at stake in discrimination cases, and how might
we reconcile their conflicts?
I.
Among the earliest uses of “dignity” by the Supreme Court
came in Chisholm v. Georgia, which held that a citizen of
South Carolina could sue the state of Georgia in federal court for a
debt the state refused to pay.1 The majority determined that he
could, because the dignity of the people preempted the dignity of
the states.2 After all, it reasoned, the states owe their very existence
to “the People”; if the people are subject to federal diversity
jurisdiction despite their weightier dignity, why should the states
be excused? 3
Outrage followed Chisholm, which was swiftly undone by the
11th Amendment.4 With it vanished the priority of human dignity
to state dignity in sovereign immunity doctrine. In fact, the Court
has turned Chisholm inside-out: not only does the “dignity of the
people” play no role in the contemporary doctrine, but the “dignity
of the states” has crowded out most other competing
considerations, including the very text of the 11th Amendment.5

1. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (opinions of Blair, Wilson & Cushing,
JJ. & Jay, C.J., seriatim).
2. Id. at 455 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
3. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People, in Order to form a more perfect Union . . . .”);
see Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 456 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“If the dignity of each singly is
undiminished” by defending a suit in federal court, then “the dignity of all jointly,” in the
form of the state, “must be unimpaired.”) (emphasis added); id. at 470–71, 472 (opinion of
Jay, C.J.) (In the United States, the People hold the “becoming dignity” of sovereignty,
whereas their “rulers have none.”).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
5. Compare id. (prohibiting extension of federal diversity jurisdiction to any lawsuit
against a state), with Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding, inter alia, that the 11th
Amendment exemplifies an unenumerated principle of state sovereign immunity that
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The “preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity,” declared
the Court in 2002, “is to accord States the dignity that is consistent
with their status as sovereign entities.”6 It’s as if the states were
medieval monarchies ruling their citizens as feudal subjects;
sovereign immunity saves the states from the vulgar humiliation of
answering to a mere citizen—even one of their own.
II.
The use of “dignity” to protect the prerogatives of state
sovereignty is literally medieval. It recalls the vast array of
privileges known as noble “dignities,” held by those of high birth
or status during the Middle Ages.7 The notion of “dignitary” harm
as personal insult descended from these medieval status
hierarchies. “Dignity” signified a high, legally enforced status,
while an “indignity” occurred when that status was violated
or ignored.8
While the United States has never enacted legal hierarchies
based on rank or status,9 it has never hesitated to act out socio-racial
ones. White Anglo-Saxon Protestants placed 19th-century Irish and
Italian immigrants in a lower caste, if not a lower race,10 as they did
20th century Jews.11 Legal discrimination against Chinese and
Japanese immigrants was widespread; well into the 20th century,
they were ineligible for naturalized citizenship and were prohibited
precludes federal question jurisdiction in an action against a state, even when brought by
one of its own citizens).
6. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (emphasis
added). Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96–97 (1996), apparently disavowed this
rationale, but it resurfaced almost immediately in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748–49 (1999).
7. See J.M. ROBERTS, PENGUIN HISTORY OF EUROPE 160 (1996); John Bell Henneman,
Nobility, Privilege and Fiscal Politics in Late Medieval France, 13 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 1 (1983); Josiah
C. Russell, The Triumph of Dignity over Order in England, 9 HISTORIAN 137, 146–47 (1947).
8. See Dignity, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www-oed-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/
view/Entry/52653?redirectedFrom=dignity#eid (last visited Oct. 20, 2020); Indignity,
OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY,
https://www-oed-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/view/Entry/
94500?redirectedFrom=indignity#eid (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
9. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. § 10, cl. 1 (barring grants of “titles of nobility”
by the federal government or the states).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (denying
southeast Asian eligibility for citizenship, because he was not “the type of man” whom
Congress “knew as white,” but including as white “the dark-eyed, swarthy people” of
southern and eastern Europe). See generally Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
11. See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS 370, 449–60 (1987).
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by California and the other coastal states from owning
real property. 12
Latter-day Saints were also subordinated in a racial hierarchy,
despite their predominantly New England and Northern
European heritage. Nineteenth-century Republicans racialized
Mormons in their fight against polygamy, painting them as Asian
or Middle Eastern tribal chieftains with harems and scores of
children;13 this patriarchal rule was deemed incompatible with
republican government.14 The irony is that 19th century law
subordinated monogamously married women to their husbands,
whom the law empowered to rule their households every bit as
arbitrarily as the caricature of the Asian chieftain; this, too, was a
status hierarchy.
None of these groups was treated as badly as African
Americans. Protections of slavery were written into the
Constitution.15 Even after slavery’s abolition,16 Jim Crow
subordinated African Americans by law in the South and in fact in
the North, through segregated public schools, hotels, and
restaurants; exclusion of African Americans from voting and jury
service; racially restrictive covenants and segregated housing;
12. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U.S. 197 (1923); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); Yamashita v. Hinkle,
260 U.S. 199 (1922); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (The Chinese constitute “a race so different from our own that we do
not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging
to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country.”).
13. Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy,
19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287 (2010); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)
(“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe,
and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the
life of Asiatic and of African people.”).
14. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (discussing statute barring
polygamists from holding office or voting):
[C]ertainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in the
founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth . . . than that which seeks to
establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing
from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony;
the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that slaves count as 3/5ths of a person
in congressional apportionment); id. § 9, cl. 1 (denying Congress power to prohibit
importation of slaves for 20 years); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that fugitive slaves shall be
returned to their owner upon the latter’s demand).
16. Id. amend. XIII.
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anti-miscegenation laws; and intentional refusal by public
authorities to protect African Americans from private violence
against their persons and property.17 A customary code every bit as
detailed as the medieval noble dignities enforced Black subjugation
to White Supremacy, on pain of lynching and death.18
These days, racial and sex-based status hierarchies are not
written into law, and such private hierarchies are less common,
though depressingly persistent. Still, American law now recognizes
only one high rank, one preeminent caste, to which everyone
belongs. As Jeremy Waldron has written, every person is “a
Brahmin. Every man a duke. Every woman a queen.”19 Today we
all equally enjoy the same high dignity.
Or do we?
III.
Not quite ten years ago, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins
walked into a Denver bakery, Masterpiece Cakeshop, to order
a wedding cake for their coming reception. But the owner,
Jack Phillips, refused their order, because his conservative
Christian beliefs forbade him from endorsing or participating in a
same-sex marriage.20
Now, it’s quite unclear that baking a cake for a wedding
reception—even a unique, custom-designed cake of the sort
Phillips baked—amounts to “endorsement” or “participation” in
the marriage the reception celebrates. I’ve been to scores of
wedding receptions, but never once has it occurred to me that the
wedding cake signified the baker’s blessing of the marriage or
participation in the ceremony.
But we can set that aside. More salient is the collision of two
dignities in this situation—Craig’s and Mullins’s dignity of
citizenship, and Phillips’s dignity of religious conscience.

17. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1875). See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863–1877 (1988).
18. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421 (1960).
19. JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 34 (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2015).
20. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
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A.
I do not doubt that Craig and Mullins suffered serious dignitary
harm in the form of personal insult, nor do I discount the hurt they
must have felt. Phillips essentially invoked the age-old insult, “I do
not serve your kind.”21 What a slap in the face!—the precise act
which once signaled an offense to dignity so grave that it could only
be redressed by apology or duel. That the refusal was religiously
sincere hardly softened the blow; delivered in the midst of the
excitement of wedding plans, it turned “what should have been a
happy occasion” into “a humiliating one.”22
And yet, insult and humiliation seem off the mark. Protection
of personal dignity is low on our list of constitutional priorities,
which is why Americans with any public standing find it nearly
impossible to win a defamation suit.23 A legal doctrine of personal
insult would be similarly problematic. Is the measure subjective or
objective? Is dignity violated if the plaintiff sincerely feels insulted,
like a dignitary “thin-skull” rule, or must the feeling be
“reasonable,” in the sense that the “average ordinary person”
would have been insulted? The history of negligence in tort teaches
that “average person” standards are fraught with bias. It took
revolutions in racial and sexual equality before white American
males would concede that their perspectives and experiences were
not shared by women and people of color. Asking overwhelmingly
straight judges and juries to decide which refusals of service are
insulting (or not) to the “average ordinary LGBTQ person” is not a
development to hope for.
Most importantly, insult or humiliation is not the only target at
which antidiscrimination laws are aimed, and perhaps not even the
21. See Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons
to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177, 190, 192 (2015). Phillips’s precise words were a matter
of dispute, but the parties agreed that he unambiguously refused to bake a custom-designed
cake for any celebration of any same-sex union, for reasons of religious conscience.
22. Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig & Dave Mullins at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); see also 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 141 (2014) (The pervasive humiliations
heaped on African Americans in the Jim Crow South left them with a “degenerating sense
of ‘nobodiness.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.);
Melling, supra note 21, at 189 (“At their core,” religious accommodations from
anti-discrimination laws “produce a dignitary harm for the person who is turned away.”).
23. See, e.g., Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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principal one. When Pope Francis condemns the death penalty as
an attack on human dignity,24 it is not because execution is
humiliating; rather, it’s because execution disrespects the
condemned as a person, violating his dignity.25 State-sponsored
execution implies that we ourselves are God, empowered to render
justice we do not understand by taking life we did not create, using
another person for revenge or deterrence.26 Executions might
humiliate or insult the condemned, but these are secondary to the
violation of his humanity.
Refusals of service based on race, sex, religion, sexual
orientation, or gender identity do not only offend one’s personal
dignity, but also her dignity of citizenship. We commonly think of
rights of citizenship as entitlements to political and governmental
participation—the rights to vote, to serve on juries, to serve in
government office. I am using “citizenship” in a broader, less
technical sense. Waldron points out that political philosophers
often use “citizen” to refer to any resident properly subject to a
country’s authority. “[C]itizenship connotes not only the rights,
powers, and responsibilities of a privileged class but also the
general quality of relationship between the state and those subject
to its power.”27
This broader understanding of citizenship overlaps with the
sense of “citizenship” held by Republicans in the 39th Congress,
24. E.g., Pope Francis, Address to Participants in the Meeting Promoted by the
Pontifical Council for Promoting the New Evangelization (Vatican City, Oct. 11, 2017),
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2017/october/documents/papa
-francesco_20171011_convegno-nuova-evangelizzazione.html; see, e.g., Elizabetta Povoledo
& Laurie Goodstein, Pope Francis Declares Death Penalty Always Wrong, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 2018 (§ A), at 1, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/world/europe/popedeath-penalty.html.
25. See Pope Francis, supra note 24 (“[T]he death penalty is an inhumane measure
that . . . abases human dignity.”); Povoledo & Goodstein, supra note 24, at 1 (“‘[E]very life is
sacred, every human person is endowed with an inalienable dignity . . . .’”) (quoting Francis).
26. See Pope Francis, supra note 24 (The death penalty “is per se contrary to the Gospel,
because it entails the willful suppression of a human life . . . of which—ultimately—
only God is the true judge and guarantor.”); Povoledo & Goodstein, supra note 24, at 1
(“[C]apital punishment ‘does not render justice to the victims, but rather fosters
vengeance.’”) (quoting Francis).
27. Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship and Dignity, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 327,
335 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013); see also id. (“Most constitutional rights and other
legal protections enjoyed by those who are, in the technical sense, citizens of a given polity
are likely to be enjoyed by noncitizens too.”); U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing
due process and equal protection rights to “any person”).
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which drafted the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
14th Amendment.28 Moderate Republicans affirmatively denied
that the unspecified “privileges” and “immunities” of “citizens”
included rights of political participation; they insisted these
referred to common law “civil rights,” like the rights to make and
enforce contracts, to access the courts, and to acquire, hold, and
dispose of real and personal property.29 Radical Republicans went
much further, arguing not only for inclusion of civil and political
rights, but also for those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
which then applied only to the federal government, and even for a
range of unenumerated natural and customary rights.30
The Supreme Court’s Reconstruction-era decisions eviscerated
any possibility that the Privileges or Immunities Clause might
meaningfully shelter individual rights.31 In the course of time,
however, the Court deployed the Due Process Clause to apply
virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states,
and to constitutionalize numerous unenumerated rights, including
rights to control the education and upbringing of one’s children,32
to live in extended family units,33 to marry the person of one’s
choice,34 and to shield private sexual acts and reproductive choices
from state scrutiny.35

28. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”); see also id.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States.”).
29. See PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR &
REVA B. SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 332–35 (7th ed. 2018)
(discussing drafting and enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
Most Republicans in the 39th Congress understood that one purpose of the
14th Amendment was to place the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on firmer
constitutional footing than was provided by the Enforcement Clause of the
13th Amendment. See id. at 335–36; WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM JUDICIAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 47–48 (1988).
30. See BREST ET AL., supra note 29, at 336–45; NELSON, supra note 29, at 52.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. 36 (1873); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
32. E.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
33. E.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
34. E.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting
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There are, therefore, philosophical, originalist, and doctrinal
justifications for thinking about the rights and privileges of
“citizenship” in broader terms than political participation. One
such privilege is the right to freely circulate in public commercial
markets to fulfill one’s legitimate wants and needs. Whether
citizens or not, Americans take for granted that they may enter
any commercial establishment open to the public to purchase
goods and services. (At least, straight white Americans take this
for granted.) This expectation is reinforced by federal and state
antidiscrimination statutes and was part of the common law before
it was infected with Jim Crow.36 People should not have to
undertake “accommodations reconnaissance” to determine
whether a business will serve them. “Unless and until the
government disallows that kind of discrimination, the risk of
unequal citizenship remains real.”37 The right to circulate freely
in public commercial markets is one of the dignities of citizenship,
and its denial an indignity. As Justice Kennedy wrote in
Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay
couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in
dignity and worth. [I]t is a general rule that [religious] objections
do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy
and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods
and services under a neutral and generally applicable public
accommodations law.38

distribution of contraceptives to single persons for prevention of pregnancy but not for
prevention of disease violated Equal Protection Clause of 14th Amendment).
36. E.g., Title II, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (2016).
See generally Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (documenting how the common law developed a right
to exclude customers from retail businesses in response to the racial equality that emerged
during Reconstruction).
37. NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS EGALITARIANISM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 35 (2017).
38. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018); see
also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)) (The “‘deprivation of personal dignity’” effected by ‘“denials
of equal access to public establishments’” is both a “stigmatizing injury” and a “denial of
equal opportunity.”).
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B.
But the dignity of citizenship was only half the story of
Masterpiece Cakeshop. Against the dignity of citizenship, Phillips
raised the dignity of religious conscience. Rights of religious
conscience have a long rhetorical history in the United States. The
founding era is filled with references to the “sacred” rights of
conscience, perhaps most famously in James Madison’s Memorial
and Remonstrance against the Virginia Assessment Bill:
[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, “that
Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence.” The Religion then of every man must be
left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the
right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.39

Constitutional care for the dignity of religious conscience is
evident in the 1st Amendment’s guarantee of religious free exercise
and prohibition of religious establishments,40 as well as in
Article VI’s proscription of religious tests for federal office.41 These
protections were eventually applied to the states as well.42 Phillips
prevailed in Masterpiece Cakeshop precisely because the Court
thought the state had failed to treat his claim of religious conscience
with the dignity the Constitution demanded.43
Still, the United States has never protected religious conscience
to the nearly absolute degree implied by Madison and the
constitutional text. Current law allows the state to impose
incidental burdens on religious exercise in pursuit of its legitimate
39. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments para. 1
(June 20, 1785) (quoting VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XIV).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”).
41. Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
42. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947); cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (state test for position of public trust held
invalid under Establishment Clause).
43. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729, 1731 (“The neutral and respectful
consideration to which Phillips was entitled was compromised here. . . . [T]he Commission’s
treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base
laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.”). Though the Court here
seems clearly to recognize a dignitary concept, it continues its pattern of recognizing
dignitary harms from racial and other kinds of invidious discrimination, but not in analyzing
free exercise rights.

970

1.GEDICKS_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

3/28/2021 12:55 AM

971

Dignity and Discrimination

goals,44 so long as it does not single out religion for burdens not
imposed on similarly situated secular activities.45 The free exercise
of religion is a constitutional right, to be sure, but it’s an equality
right, not a liberty right. Congress and many states have enacted
“religious liberty statutes” which mandate heightened scrutiny of
even incidental burdens on religion, but even these permit state
interests to violate the dignity of religious conscience for weighty
goals that cannot otherwise be achieved.46
IV.
The key to resolving conflicts between dignity of religious
conscience and dignity of citizenship lies in the place or site where
these dignities collide.47 Dignity of citizenship and dignity of
conscience are inversely related through the public or private
character of the site where they assert themselves.48 Dignity of
44. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
45. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
The Court’s free exercise doctrine is in flux on this point, at least as regards
applications for emergency relief from COVID-related restrictions on worship and other
religious activities. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The U.S. Supreme Court and Pandemic
Restrictions on Religious Worship, TALK ABOUT: LAW & RELIGION (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2020/12/09/the-u-s-supreme-court-and-pandemic-restrictions/.
Compare S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief) (arguing that courts should defer
to pandemic restrictions on worship so long as “[s] imilar or more severe restrictions apply
to comparable secular gatherings”), with Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,
141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (applying strict scrutiny to highly restrictive pandemic limitation
on worship).
46. E.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb;
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc;
see, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzalez: A Look at State RFRAs,
55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010).
47. Cf. ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 90 (1989) (apparently inconsistent moral actions can be made
coherent by considering the different places or contexts in which they occur).
48. I have discussed the importance of the public or private character of the site of
accommodation in Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public, Private, Religious? Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts in the U.S. States, 3 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 772 (2015); Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Panel Presentation and Discussion at the Claremont Graduate University
Conference on Religious Liberty in the 21st Century: The Odd Couple: Freedom from
Religion and Religious Group Rights (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qBA5kJym7Qo&list=PLhqg559k1eTvNNNaJLVUL9-LNTt_SfLQ-&index=41&t=0s;
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Chautauqua Institution Interfaith Lecture Series: Three Problems
of Pluralism in Masterpiece Cakeshop (Aug. 9, 2018), https://online.chq.org/
ci/sessions/11503/view; and Frederick Mark Gedicks, Discussion at the Centro per le
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conscience is more at home, and makes a more powerful claim for
recognition, the more private the site of accommodation. Dignity of
citizenship is the opposite—the more public the site, the more
powerful its claim. Consider how these dignities interact in a
religious congregation and a government office.
A.
A “house of worship” is quintessentially private space. Chapels
and cathedrals were once literal sanctuaries beyond royal
jurisdiction; a person who grasped the altar, even a felon, could not
be touched by the King or his agents.49 The tradition of sanctuary
persists to this day, most commonly in undocumented aliens who
lodge in a church to forestall deportation; though nothing legally
prohibits it, law enforcement is normally loath to invade a church
except in the most serious circumstances.50
Religious congregations enjoy absolute immunity from liability
under antidiscrimination laws when they hire or fire their leaders
and others who teach the congregation’s doctrine or exemplify
its practices.51 They may welcome or cast out members on any
basis they please,52 and the state is categorically prohibited from
using theology to decide conflicts among their members or

Scienze Religiose, Fondazione Bruno Kessler: Dignity and Discrimination: Religious
Accommodation, Antidiscrimination Laws, and Reproductive Rights in the United States
(and Europe) (Nov. 4, 2019); see also Elder Lance B. Wickman, Address at the 2016 Brigham
Young University Religious Freedom Conference: Promoting Religious Freedom in a Secular
Age: Fundamental Principles, Practical Priorities, and Fairness for All (July 7, 2016),
https://newsroom.churchofjesuschrist.org/article/promoting-religious-freedom-secularage-fundamental-principles-practical-priorities-fairness-for-all
(discussing
religious
accommodations in terms of the public/private distinction).
49. See J.H. Baker, The English Law of Sanctuary, 2 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 8 (1990).
50. See, e.g., Paighten Harkins, Mariah Noble & Bob Mims, Utah Woman Who Has
‘Exhausted Her Appeals’ Will Try to Revive Her Case in Immigration Court — from the Sanctuary
of a Salt Lake City Church, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.sltrib.com/news/
politics/2018/01/31/mother-seeks-sanctuary-at-utah-church-rather-than-boarding-planefor-deportation-to-honduras/.
51. E.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020);
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n,
565 U.S. 171 (2012); Serbian E. Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
52. Cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (statutory exemption of church’s commercial nonprofit business
from Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not violate Establishment Clause).
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with outsiders.53 Members are free to worship and express
themselves within the congregation however they wish, so long as
they do not violate the criminal law or infringe upon the rights of
unconsenting others. Citizen rights of service or participation are
inapplicable, if not wholly irrelevant, in this private religious space.
B.
Now contrast the religious congregation with a government
office. A county clerk’s office, for example, is where one may vote,
register a vehicle, record property deeds and transfers, pay state
and local taxes, obtain a marriage license, and otherwise conduct
business with the government; county officials might also be
empowered to solemnize marriages. All this work is administered
by an elected or appointed government official, the county clerk,
who is authorized to act in the name of the county government.
So a county clerk’s office is public in two senses: it is a physical
location that members of the public have a right to enter to transact
business with the government, and it is a government position
filled by an agent of the people who is obligated to serve them.
It is hard to imagine physical or conceptual space that is more
public, and thus where the dignity of citizenship makes more
powerful claims.
When a county clerk refuses to issue a marriage license to a
same-sex couple for reasons of religious conscience, her claim is
weak.54 Her personal dignity of conscience cannot override the
dignity of citizenship in such a quintessentially public space. Even
if the state is willing to accommodate her claim, it ought not to; no
government official should be afforded the power to unilaterally

53. E.g., Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94
(1952) (constitutionalizing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871)).
54. Cf. Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880, slip op. at 2, 2015 WL 10692640, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug.
26, 2015) (“[I]t cannot be defensibly argued that the holder of the Rowan County Clerk’s
office . . . may decline to act in conformity with the United States Constitution as interpreted
by a dispositive holding of the United States Supreme Court.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 23
(2015). See generally Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex
Marriage Licenses, Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2015 (§ A), at 1,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html.
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excuse herself from the duties of her office.55 Government offices
exist to serve all the people. The officials who fill and administer
them are elected by the people or appointed by someone who is.
They take an oath to discharge their offices fairly and without
discriminating.56 Their compensation is funded from taxes assessed
on all the people. It is, therefore, an indignity, a violation of the
dignity of citizenship, for a clerk to deny service to any of the
people she is pledged to serve. It matters not that the same service
is available in the next county over, or from a subordinate official
or employee in the clerk’s own office. Citizens are entitled to public
service from those they elect to carry it out; those who occupy and
administer the power of such offices may not pick or choose which
of the people they will serve,57 even for so weighty a reason as
religious conscience. As Justice Scalia once suggested, a
government official whose religious conscience prevents her from
performing the duties of her office must resign.58
V.
These are “easy cases” because they represent the two poles of
the public/private continuum, where one or the other
uncontroversially predominates. The public or private character of
other sites where dignities commonly conflict is less clear—
religious nonprofit businesses and activities, retail commercial
businesses, housing and employment, and participation in
government contracts and funding programs are areas where
dignity conflicts are common. Mutually satisfactory agreements
55. Cf. Ermold v. Davis, 936 F.3d 429, 437 (6th Cir. 2019) (Obergefell “said nothing to
suggest that government officials may flout the Constitution by enacting religious-based
policies to accommodate their own religious beliefs.”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020).
56. Some clerks swear an oath to discharge their duties “without favor, affection or
partiality.” See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30A.020 (West 1978). Others swear to uphold “the
Constitution,” see, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 10, which would include Equal Protection
Clause prohibitions on invidious discrimination, see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(sexual orientation); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967) (race).
57. Cf. Ermold, 936 F.3d at 436 (“[N]owhere in the Constitution—or in constitutional
law, for that matter—does it say that a government official may infringe constitutional rights
so long as another official might not have. All government officials must respect all
constitutional rights.”).
58. Lisa Miller, Justice Scalia Speaks for Himself on Death Penalty, Not the
Catholic Church, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
on-faith/justice-scalia-speaks-for-himself-on-death-penalty-not-the-catholic-church/2011/
10/26/gIQAXkueLM_story.html.
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resolving conflicts at these sites are difficult to achieve because of
their zero-sum quality—every concession to the dignity of the other
side comes at the expense of one’s own.59
The public-private distinction is itself controversial.
Anti-foundationalists argue that it’s illusory, that purportedly
“private” activities or locations can be plausibly recharacterized as
“public,” and vice-versa.60 Nevertheless, liberal democratic theory
has long rested the meaningful protection of human rights on some
boundary between locations controlled by idiosyncratic values
presumed beyond government regulation (the private) and
activities and locations where government is properly present and
shared values presumptively predominate (the public).61 It is
difficult to imagine a free society in which every aspect of life is
public, and equally difficult to imagine an orderly society in which
every aspect of life is up for private grabs. The “ordered liberty”
safeguarded by liberal democracy requires a zone for each of the
public and the private.62
Of course, the boundary between the public and the private
does not correspond to any naturally existing feature of the
physical world; it is largely, if not entirely, a socio-political
construct.63 The boundary moves back and forth in response to
contingent cultural, economic, legal, political, and social forces.64
Activities and locations once thought indisputably private, like
59. Cf. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2336 (1997) (arguing
that antidiscrimination laws are “understood as a sign of increased social status” for LGBTQ
persons obtained “at the expense of heterosexuals”—i.e., “homosexuals are being given
something new that is being taken away from heterosexuals”).
60. See, e.g., MARIANO CROCE & ANDREA SALVATORE, UNDOING TIES: POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY AT THE WANING OF THE STATE 78–79 (Engl. Trans. 2015).
The literature on the socially constructed character of “public” and “private” is
extensive. The locus classicus is Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843), in 3 KARL MARX &
FREDERICK ENGELS, COLLECTED WORKS 146 (Int’l Publishers 1975). For a balanced and
succinct analysis, see Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits
on Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (1993).
61. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government (1690), in TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 3, 89–94 (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1965).
62. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937).
63. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671,
680–81 (1992); see also Alexander, supra note 60, at 371 (“We perceive matters as appropriately
assigned to one or the other of these domains in part because we are socially constructed to
do so.”).
64. See, e.g., IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 6–7, 12 (1999).
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“the home,” where government has no place or power, are now
proper areas of government regulation, to punish, for example,
child abuse and marital rape.65 Other matters once thought
uncontroversially public, like restrictions on marriage, use of
contraceptives, and access to abortion, are now substantially
insulated from government regulation and scrutiny by the
constitutional right to privacy.66
Nevertheless, the social contingency of the public-private
boundary does not make its location random or unpredictable. At
any given time, one can make reasonable judgments about social
expectations regarding the public or private character of a site of
dignity conflicts, informed by judicial decisions, enacted statutes,
public political discussions, and practical experience which shape
and illuminate such expectations.67 Perhaps the most important
factor in setting the public/private boundary is the potential to
interfere with the rights or legitimate interests of others;
it is difficult to argue that an activity is “private” when it harms
other people. The Court itself has tended to protect religious
conscience in contexts that do not involve material harms or costs

65. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 494–95
(1999) (“Traditionally, the law has viewed violence in the family as a private issue, into which
the law should not intrude . . . . Feminists have shown that, to the extent family violence is
beyond the reach of the law, men’s abuse of and power over women is enabled and
affirmed.”). Compare id. at 495 (describing abrogation or qualification of the common law
immunity for spousal rape as a welcome step against domestic violence), with MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (1980) (defending retention of the spousal rape immunity as a
guarantee of marital privacy).
66. E.g., June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (access to abortion);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (access to marriage by same-sex couples); Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (access to abortion); Loving v. Virginia,
338 U.S. 1 (1967) (access to marriage by interracial couples); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraception).
67. See, e.g. TEBBE, supra note 37, at 33–35 (applying Rawls’s “reflective equilibrium”
to determine when a religious accommodation from an anti-discrimination law is
appropriate); cf. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 338–39 (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall rev. trans., 2013):
[T]he judge’s judgment does not proceed from an arbitrary and unpredictable
decision, but from the just weighing up of the whole. Anyone who has immersed
himself in the particular situation is capable of undertaking this just weighing-up.
This is why in a state governed by law, there is legal certainty—i.e., it is in principle
possible to know what the exact situation is.
Id.; see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 8 (1996) (Reflection on “the shared fund of
implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles” of “public culture” helps to identify
institutions suited to securing liberal democratic values.).
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to others.68 These judgments of public and private can resolve
conflicts of dignities, as they do with religious congregations and
government offices.
***
Nearly a century ago, our own Justice Sutherland—raised just
down the road in Springville, and still the only Utahn to serve on
the Supreme Court—surprised his libertarian brethren by writing
what remains the leading opinion on zoning under the Due Process
Clause. Defending zoning as the statutory analog to the common
law of nuisance, Sutherland explained that “[a] nuisance may
merely be a right thing in a wrong place,—like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard.”69
Dignity of citizenship and dignity of religious conscience are
both “right things” worth defending—but not everywhere. It is no
denigration of either the dignity of the citizen or the dignity of
conscience to require that their conflicts be mediated by deciding
which one is the right thing in the right place.

68. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
573 U.S. 682 (2014); cf. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (declaring statute
exempting commercial employees from working on their Sabbath unconstitutional because
of burden imposed on employers and other employees). See generally Frederick Mark
Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate:
An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014);
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby
Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2014);
Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe & Richard Schragger, The Costs of Conscience,
106 KY. L.J. 781 (2017).
The statutory exemption from mandatory military service, afforded to religious, but
not secular, pacifists, is not to the contrary. Notwithstanding its textual restriction to
religious belief, the Court extended the exemption to nonreligious pacifists to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Justice
Harlan would have declared the exemption unconstitutional as written. Id. at 356–61
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a draft exemption statute which accommodates
religious but not secular pacifists is an unconstitutional religious preference). See generally
William P. Marshall, Third-Party Burdens and Conscientious Objection to War, 106 KY. L.J. 685
(2017) (suggesting that the religious draft exemption is historically and doctrinally sui generis
and inapplicable beyond situations involving mandatory military service).
69. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
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